US-China Tech War: Blueprint of the Future Great Game

The California and Oregon wildfires of 2020 revealed an unexpected consequence of the intensifying technological confrontation between the United States and China. Restrictions imposed by the Trump administration on Chinese-made drones, particularly DJI products, complicated firefighting operations that had increasingly relied on advanced aerial technology.

These restrictions reflected wider American concerns over espionage, technological vulnerabilities and China’s state-led economic model. Washington has long accused Beijing of practices ranging from economic espionage to forced technology transfers and state-backed efforts to acquire foreign technological expertise.

The dispute has since expanded far beyond drones. Semiconductors, artificial intelligence, 5G infrastructure, telecommunications, data security and advanced military technologies have emerged as major fronts in a technological contest that could shape the future balance of global power.

Innovation Battleground: Contrasting Paths of the West and China

Huawei’s technological resurgence illustrates the difficulty of containing China’s technological development. Once one of the world’s largest smartphone manufacturers, Huawei faced severe restrictions designed to limit its access to advanced semiconductor technologies.

Yet the company surprised observers with the launch of the Mate 60 Pro, powered by the Kirin 9000S chip manufactured by China’s Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC). The development demonstrated that China retained considerable technological capabilities despite Washington-led restrictions.

The United States has sought to preserve its technological advantage by restricting Beijing’s access to critical technologies. SMIC’s progress towards advanced semiconductor manufacturing, however, has raised questions about the long-term effectiveness of such restrictions.

Nevertheless, the narrative that China is inevitably overtaking the West technologically is overly simplistic. China is investing heavily in becoming a global science and technology power, while Western economies continue to benefit from decentralised innovation ecosystems, research institutions, private-sector competition and established technological networks.

China’s Shenzhen technology hub demonstrates Beijing’s growing innovative capacity. China also approaches technology as a long-term geopolitical issue, integrating technological development into national economic and strategic planning.

The consequences extend far beyond the two competitors. Technological and economic fragmentation between major powers risks weakening global growth, disrupting supply chains and reducing opportunities for shared prosperity.

US-China Chip War: Taiwan’s Crucial Role in the Battle

Taiwan occupies a central position in the US-China technological rivalry because of its importance to the global semiconductor industry. Political developments surrounding the island therefore carry implications far beyond the Taiwan Strait.

The semiconductor conflict has become one of the most important fronts of US-China competition. Washington views restrictions on advanced semiconductor technologies as necessary to preserve its technological and military advantage. Beijing, meanwhile, considers such restrictions an attempt to constrain China’s economic and strategic development.

American restrictions on exports of advanced chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment have attempted to slow China’s technological progress. Huawei’s ability to launch a 5G smartphone equipped with an advanced domestically manufactured chip nevertheless demonstrated the limitations of technological containment.

Taiwan Semiconductor’s ‘Silicon Shield’

Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has often been described as a “silicon shield” because its importance to the global economy potentially raises the economic cost of conflict over the island.

According to the Rhodium Group, a Chinese blockade of Taiwan could disrupt more than $2 trillion in economic activity even without escalating into direct military confrontation.

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces critical components ranging from smartphone chipsets and automobile microcontrollers to sophisticated graphics processing units. Its products support industries and companies across the global economy.

China has ambitious technological objectives, including those associated with the Made in China 2025 strategy, but its domestic semiconductor industry has historically remained unable to satisfy all of its requirements for cutting-edge chips.

This dependence has strengthened Taiwan’s strategic importance. Any disruption of TSMC’s operations would affect not only China but manufacturing and supply chains worldwide.

China’s Accelerated Timeline for Taiwan

American military and intelligence assessments have repeatedly examined China’s efforts to strengthen its ability to conduct operations against Taiwan. Particular attention has been given to reports that President Xi Jinping directed the People’s Liberation Army to develop the capabilities necessary for a potential Taiwan contingency by 2027.

Various American officials have offered different assessments regarding possible timelines. These statements should not necessarily be interpreted as predictions of an inevitable invasion, but they demonstrate growing concern over military developments in the Taiwan Strait.

The conflict in Ukraine has further highlighted the importance of defence-industrial capacity. American strategic discussions increasingly emphasise the need to strengthen military production and supply chains in preparation for possible high-intensity conflicts involving major powers.

Pentagon Expands Operations to Counter China’s Ambitions

The United States has been expanding its defence-industrial capacity while developing new technologies designed to counter China’s military advantages.

The Pentagon’s Replicator initiative, for example, seeks to deploy large numbers of autonomous systems and AI-enabled platforms. The initiative reflects a broader shift towards using technological innovation to counter China’s advantages in scale and military mass.

The semiconductor conflict adds another dimension to these calculations. If China’s access to TSMC’s most advanced technologies continues to decline, some analysts argue that the economic deterrent associated with Taiwan’s semiconductor industry could also evolve.

Critical Juncture in the US-China Chip War

In September 2022, US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan outlined a significant shift in America’s technology strategy. Rather than remaining only a few generations ahead of strategic competitors, Washington increasingly sought to maintain as large a technological advantage as possible in selected critical technologies.

This approach reflected concerns that technologies such as advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence and computing capabilities could act as strategic force multipliers.

The United States subsequently introduced extensive export controls targeting China’s semiconductor development. These measures restricted access to advanced AI chips, semiconductor-design software and sophisticated manufacturing equipment.

At the same time, TSMC continued moving towards increasingly advanced manufacturing processes, including 3-nanometre technology. The continuing transition towards smaller and more efficient semiconductor nodes illustrates the technological challenge confronting Chinese manufacturers.

Huawei’s Resurgence Tests US Export Controls

Huawei’s Mate 60 Pro became a symbol of the limitations facing the American export-control strategy. Its SMIC-manufactured 7-nanometre chip suggested that Chinese companies had achieved greater technological progress than some observers expected.

Analysts subsequently debated whether existing restrictions were sufficiently comprehensive to prevent Chinese semiconductor manufacturers from advancing further.

The episode highlighted a fundamental dilemma for Washington: restrictions must be strong enough to protect strategic technologies without unnecessarily damaging American and allied companies that depend upon the Chinese market.

Export Restrictions and Nvidia

The United States has repeatedly adjusted export controls to restrict China’s access to advanced computing chips, including products developed by Nvidia.

However, the global semiconductor supply chain is deeply interconnected. Equipment manufacturers and chip companies continue to derive significant revenue from China, creating commercial pressure against complete technological separation.

ASML and other semiconductor-equipment manufacturers illustrate this dilemma. China remains an important market, while revenues generated there can help finance the research and development required for Western companies to maintain their technological leadership.

At the same time, critics warn that continued access to advanced equipment could accelerate China’s ability to develop domestic alternatives to Western technologies.

China’s Dilemma: Balancing the Economy and Taiwan

China’s calculations regarding Taiwan cannot be understood solely through economic considerations. Beijing faces domestic economic challenges, including slower growth and structural problems associated with property and infrastructure investment.

Nevertheless, President Xi Jinping has consistently linked reunification with Taiwan to China’s broader national rejuvenation.

Technology, economic power, military capability and Taiwan therefore form interconnected elements of China’s strategic calculations. Beijing’s ambition to become a leading technological power cannot be separated from its broader efforts to strengthen national economic and defence capabilities.

Beijing’s Progress in Military Technology

China has invested heavily in emerging military technologies, including autonomous systems, drones, satellites, electronic warfare and hypersonic weapons.

American assessments have expressed concern about the expansion of China’s satellite and jamming capabilities, which could complicate US military targeting and communications during a conflict.

Geography also provides China with important advantages in a Taiwan contingency. American forces would have to operate across considerable distances, while nearby US facilities and allied bases could potentially face missile threats.

The question of international support for Taiwan would therefore become crucial in any confrontation. The United States does not formally support Taiwanese independence, but it provides Taiwan with defensive equipment and maintains extensive security interests in the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan Semiconductor’s Expansion in Arizona

The strategic importance of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry has encouraged the United States to reduce its dependence on overseas production.

TSMC, founded by Morris Chang in 1987, transformed semiconductor manufacturing by developing the dedicated foundry model. This allowed companies such as Nvidia, Broadcom, Qualcomm and Apple to design advanced chips while outsourcing manufacturing.

Over time, TSMC’s scale and manufacturing expertise gave it a formidable competitive advantage.

The United States has attempted to rebuild domestic semiconductor manufacturing through the CHIPS and Science Act, which provided substantial incentives for new manufacturing facilities.

TSMC began developing semiconductor plants in Arizona, although the expansion encountered difficulties associated with costs, workforce availability and the complexity of transferring advanced manufacturing capabilities.

Japan has simultaneously pursued semiconductor investment through significant government incentives, while the United States has strengthened security cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines.

RISC-V Emerges as Another Front in the US-China Tech War

The technological rivalry has also expanded into open-source semiconductor architecture. American lawmakers raised concerns over US companies collaborating with Chinese entities on RISC-V, an open-source chip architecture used in technologies ranging from smartphones to artificial intelligence processors.

Lawmakers including Senators Marco Rubio and Mark Warner argued that China could exploit open technological collaboration to strengthen its semiconductor industry and military capabilities.

Representative Mike Gallagher similarly advocated tighter controls on cooperation involving Chinese entities, while Representative Michael McCaul argued that Beijing could use RISC-V to circumvent American advantages in proprietary semiconductor technologies.

The debate creates a difficult policy dilemma. RISC-V emerged from research at the University of California, Berkeley, and operates through an international open-source ecosystem.

Restricting collaboration could therefore have consequences beyond China by fragmenting global technical standards and reducing international cooperation in semiconductor development.

The Xi-Biden Meeting: Breaking the Ice

The meeting between President Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden in San Francisco during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum represented an important effort to stabilise relations between the world’s two largest economies.

The summit did not eliminate strategic competition, but it created channels for managing disagreements and preventing further deterioration in bilateral relations.

During their discussions, the leaders agreed on several areas of engagement, including:

  • Restoring high-level military communications.
  • Establishing stronger direct communication between the two leaderships.
  • Cooperating on artificial intelligence.
  • Addressing the production and trafficking of fentanyl-related substances.

The economic importance of US-China relations makes such dialogue globally significant. Together, the two economies account for a substantial share of world economic activity, while escalating trade barriers and economic fragmentation could impose major costs on global growth.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi described the meeting as an important turning point, while President Xi emphasised coexistence, dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation.

The summit demonstrated that strategic rivalry does not necessarily eliminate opportunities for selective cooperation. Maintaining communication between Washington and Beijing remains essential for reducing the risk of unintended escalation.

US-China Rivalry: Pakistan’s Strategic Dilemma

Pakistan, like many other states, faces significant challenges as the strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies.

The contemporary rivalry differs from the traditional Cold War because the world’s major economies remain deeply interconnected. The international order is simultaneously being reshaped by US-China competition, Russia’s assertiveness, Europe’s pursuit of greater strategic autonomy and the growing ambitions of middle powers.

Pakistan is particularly vulnerable to these changes because it has limited capacity to shape the global strategic environment while remaining highly sensitive to its economic and geopolitical consequences.

The US-China competition encompasses economic, technological and military dimensions. Washington seeks to preserve its technological and strategic advantages through semiconductor restrictions and wider Indo-Pacific partnerships, including AUKUS and the QUAD.

Pakistan, meanwhile, must balance its strategic partnership with China against its continuing economic, diplomatic and security relationship with the United States.

China remains one of Pakistan’s most important strategic partners, while the United States continues to hold considerable significance for Pakistan’s economy, diplomacy and international engagement.

A sharper confrontation between Washington and Beijing could therefore increase pressure on Islamabad to align more closely with one side.

Internal Strength as the Foundation of Strategic Autonomy

Pakistan’s ability to navigate the US-China rivalry ultimately depends upon its domestic economic and institutional strength. A weak Pakistan would have fewer options and could face growing external pressure to choose between competing powers.

Conversely, a politically stable and economically resilient Pakistan would possess greater diplomatic flexibility and could maintain productive relations with both Washington and Beijing.

The central challenge for Pakistan is therefore not merely choosing between the United States and China. It is strengthening its own economic, technological and institutional foundations sufficiently to protect its national interests in an increasingly competitive international system.

Conclusion

The US-China technology war has transformed technological innovation into a central arena of twenty-first-century geopolitics. Semiconductors, artificial intelligence, 5G networks, autonomous systems, satellite technologies and open-source chip architectures are no longer purely commercial assets; they have become instruments of national power.

Taiwan’s semiconductor dominance places the island at the centre of this competition, while American export controls and China’s drive for technological self-reliance are accelerating the fragmentation of global technology supply chains.

At the same time, diplomatic engagement between Washington and Beijing demonstrates that strategic competition can coexist with selective cooperation. For countries such as Pakistan, the emerging technological great game creates both risks and opportunities.

Pakistan’s most sustainable strategy lies in avoiding rigid bloc politics, strengthening its domestic economy and technological capabilities, and preserving sufficient strategic autonomy to engage constructively with both major powers.