“Unity, without the necessary conditions, is a delusion.”
B. R. Ambedkar
The debate over creating new provinces in Pakistan is a complex constitutional and political issue. Pakistan’s federal structure, inherited from the colonial era, includes large provinces that suffer from uneven development and poor administration. Proponents argue that smaller units will improve governance and strengthen regional voice. Opponents fear that redrawing boundaries will weaken the central government, ignite ethnic tensions, and increase the national economic burden. The core question is whether creating new provinces leads to a more robust, decentralised federation or whether it fractures national unity.
A persistent demand for new provinces has existed since Pakistan’s independence. This need arises mostly from the perception of neglect in vast, peripheral regions. Prominent examples include the demand for a separate South Punjab province, Hazara province in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and proposals for demarcating Sindh. These calls are often fuelled by socio-economic backwardness in districts far from provincial capitals. The historical roots of these movements show that the existing administrative structure is insufficient for governing the large population and area of current provinces, as per the National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research (NIHCR). Successive governments have seen these movements rise and fall, often resulting in political resolutions and commissions that fail to deliver a tangible new unit.
Despite claims of administrative necessity, the basis for many demands appears heavily rooted in ethnic and linguistic identity. The movement for a Saraiki province from South Punjab and the push for Hazara province, following the renaming of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, are prime examples. The Saraiki identity is the primary cultural marker for the South Punjab movement, as per Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) research published in 2015. Similarly, the Hazara demand is linked to the Hindko-speaking population resisting Pashtun dominance in the new provincial name. This suggests that identity politics is not merely a tool but a foundational element of the demand, raising concerns about potential ethno-nationalism and fragmentation within the federation.
The reality is that the new province debate is a blend of identity and governance issues. While ethnic and linguistic differences provide the political platform, the underlying drivers are severe administrative and economic disparities. Regions like South Punjab show poverty rates as high as 43%, compared to 27% in the rest of the province, as per Pew Research Centre. The demand is less about language and more about addressing unequal distribution of resources, ineffective governance, and lack of political representation. Ethnicity, therefore, acts as a mobilising factor for communities who feel isolated and deprived, turning socio-economic grievance into a unified political movement for decentralisation.
For new provinces to be viable, clear, non-political standards must guide their creation. Key criteria generally accepted include the size of the population, ensuring a manageable administrative size for better service delivery. The geographic area must be compact enough to allow efficient connectivity between the provincial centre and its peripheries. Crucially, the new unit must be economically viable, possessing sufficient resources or revenue-generating potential to sustain its administration without excessive dependence on the central government. Resource distribution and administrative feasibility should take precedence over simple ethno-linguistic lines.
The rigorous constitutional process remains the primary structural obstacle to forming new provinces. Under Article 239 of the 1973 Constitution, creating or altering a province requires a constitutional amendment. This process demands a two-thirds majority in both the National Assembly and the Senate. Furthermore, if the amendment involves changing a province’s boundaries, the respective provincial assembly must also pass a resolution supporting the change with a two-thirds majority. This high threshold was intended to safeguard federalism and provincial autonomy but, in practice, makes the creation of new units almost politically impossible.
The disconnect between rational creation standards and the difficult constitutional procedure leads to a deadlock. Though population, area, and resource viability are important, the constitutional requirement for political consensus is the deciding factor. Since no major political party holding power in the large provinces is willing to risk its vote bank by initiating the process, the rational standards are largely ignored. The political will required to overcome the two-thirds majority barrier is absent, turning the issue into a political commodity used during elections rather than a subject for serious legislative reform.
Political parties pose a significant hurdle due to their internal contradictions and vested interests. Parties like the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) often campaign on the promise of new provinces, especially in regions like South Punjab, to secure votes. However, when they gain power, they quickly backtrack or delay the legislative process. The division of a major province like Punjab would affect the PML-N’s power base, while splitting Sindh would threaten the PPP’s political stronghold. This fear of losing political territory ensures that parties prioritise electoral gains over the actual implementation of administrative reform.
Resistance also comes from the centre, often influenced by the civil and military bureaucracy. These forces favour centralisation and view decentralisation as a threat to their established authority and control over resources. The power corridors often resist changes that could complicate internal security and border management. Furthermore, the argument is often raised that the basis of demand is faulty, citing ethnic grounds rather than administrative need. The centre highlights the country’s ongoing economic crisis, arguing that new provinces would lead to a massive increase in non-development expenditures, such as creating new secretariats and hiring staff.
The failure to create new provinces is the result of a powerful coalition between self-serving political interests and institutional resistance from the centre. Political parties exploit the popular demand but refuse to take the final legislative step. Concurrently, the bureaucracy emphasises the economic and security risks to justify inaction. This dynamic ensures that while the demand remains potent at the local level, it is perpetually contained at the national level.
The result is a cycle where regional grievances are acknowledged for political purposes but never genuinely addressed through structural change, leaving the issue unresolved.
Advocates argue that creating new provinces is the ultimate way to strengthen Pakistani federalism. Smaller provinces ensure closer interaction between the government and citizens, leading to better accountability and governance. By reducing the size of unwieldy administrative units, service delivery becomes more effective in fields like health and education. Furthermore, the inclusion of previously marginalised regions in the federal decision-making processes—with their own representation in the Senate and National Assembly—addresses long-standing grievances related to unequal resource distribution and political isolation. This devolution of power strengthens the federating units, thereby strengthening the federation itself.
Conversely, opponents fear that the creation of new provinces could significantly weaken the centre. Creating provinces on purely ethnic or linguistic lines risks fuelling further sub-nationalism, leading to the fragmentation of national identity. In an already centralised federation, this added economic dependence could weaken the centre’s capacity to manage core defence and foreign policy functions.
The path to strengthening federalism lies not in simply avoiding or creating new provinces, but in setting clear priorities. If the creation is driven primarily by administrative and economic viability, as opposed to ethnic rhetoric, it can act as a stabilising force. The debate forces the federation to confront its centralised tendencies, which is inherently healthy. Structural reforms, such as effective local government systems, could be an interim solution to devolve power without redrawing boundaries. Ultimately, only a consensus-driven process that prioritises effective governance and addresses socio-economic neglect can successfully strengthen both the federating units and the centre simultaneously.
The new provinces debate in Pakistan is a profound expression of the conflict between centralised power and the desire for local autonomy. The dialectical process shows that while the call for new units is rooted in genuine administrative and economic neglect, it is often expressed through ethno-linguistic identity. This is then blocked by an almost impossible constitutional process and the political self-interest of major parties. If handled carelessly, the issue could lead to fragmentation and economic strain. However, if structural change is enacted based on non-political criteria, it offers the best chance to realise the true spirit of federalism.
By bringing government closer to the people and addressing development disparities, new provinces have the potential to strengthen the federation by making its constituent units more robust and representative.
“The art of progress is to preserve order amid change, and to preserve change amid order.”
Alfred North Whitehead