The Pahalgam Incident: Triggering the Latest Pakistan-India Crisis
Diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan were severely disrupted following the Pahalgam incident.
On 22 April 2025, armed gunmen emerged from a forested area and killed 26 tourists in the Baisaran meadow of Pahalgam, located in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir.
Responsibility for the attack was reportedly claimed by a separatist organisation known as The Resistance Front, which presents itself as being driven by Kashmiri nationalist sentiments.
Condemnations of the attack came from around the world. However, official statements from the United Nations Security Council and most international leaders did not explicitly refer to cross-border involvement or directly accuse Pakistan.
Pakistan also expressed condolences over the loss of life.
Despite the absence of publicly presented evidence, the official Indian narrative quickly linked the attack to Lashkar-e-Taiba and blamed Pakistan.
These allegations created a serious rupture in an already strained bilateral relationship and marked the beginning of another dangerous crisis between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
India’s Immediate Diplomatic Response
Following the attack, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri announced several measures aimed at downgrading relations with Pakistan.
- Visas issued to Pakistani nationals were cancelled.
- Pakistani citizens were barred from travelling under the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme.
- The Attari border crossing was closed.
- Pakistani military advisers posted at the High Commission in New Delhi were declared persona non grata and ordered to leave within one week.
- India announced the withdrawal of its military advisers from the Indian High Commission in Islamabad.
- The Indus Waters Treaty was placed in abeyance with immediate effect.
The Indian Foreign Secretary also briefed ambassadors from G20 countries in an attempt to secure international support and highlight India’s allegations against Pakistan.
Warmongering and Escalatory Rhetoric
As the space for meaningful diplomacy narrowed, aggressive rhetoric and military preparations increased.
Military forces were placed on high alert, while meetings of India’s Cabinet Committee on Security became more frequent. These meetings included the prime minister and the ministers of defence, home affairs, finance, and external affairs.
The political environment became increasingly charged with war-like sentiment. Sections of India’s mainstream media openly promoted extreme anti-Pakistan narratives, while political statements from BJP officials intensified public hostility.
The aggressive rhetoric and intelligence-related claims created fears of a military action similar to the Balakot episode of 2019.
Indian Military Action on the Night of 6 and 7 May
During the night of 6 and 7 May, India launched approximately 24 missile strikes under what it called Operation Sindoor.
India stated that the operation targeted alleged terrorist infrastructure at six locations in Pakistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
The coordinated missile, air, and drone strikes reportedly targeted:
- Sialkot
- Shakargarh
- Muridke
- Bahawalpur
- Kotli
- Muzaffarabad
Rafale aircraft reportedly used SCALP missiles and HAMMER munitions during the strikes.
Pakistan reported civilian casualties, including women and children, and stated that several mosques were also damaged.
Pakistan’s Foreign Office argued that the strikes endangered commercial aviation because several passenger aircraft were reportedly flying in the region at the time.
Pakistan’s foreign minister also stated that the Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project in Azad Jammu and Kashmir had been targeted in violation of relevant international conventions.
Use of Loitering Munitions and Drones
India also deployed drones in three waves between 7 and 10 May.
These reportedly included:
- Harop drones
- Harpy drones
- Nagastra-1 systems
- Warmate R
- Warmate 3
- ASL drones
Pakistan also launched drones, although reportedly in a single wave on 10 May, targeting military airfields, ammunition facilities, and cantonments.
Pakistani Yiha-III-class loitering munitions and Asisguard Songar drones were reportedly observed during the conflict.
Collapse of Backchannel Diplomacy
Before the Pahalgam incident, there had been speculation about backchannel engagement between Pakistan and India, reportedly facilitated by the United Arab Emirates.
These expectations existed despite recurring ceasefire violations along the Line of Control during 2024.
However, as Indian rhetoric intensified, the fragile February 2021 ceasefire arrangement effectively collapsed, and hopes for an improvement in bilateral relations disappeared.
Creating a New Normal Below the Nuclear Threshold
Operation Sindoor appeared to be an Indian attempt to create a “new normal” in which military action against Pakistan could be conducted below the nuclear threshold.
Some analysts have described this approach as “deterrence by punishment.”
However, such a doctrine is dangerous because it could normalise preventive or pre-emptive strikes based on unclear or disputed intelligence.
It also increases the chances of:
- Escalation
- Miscalculation
- Miscommunication
- Incorrect interpretation of military signals
These risks become even more serious when two nuclear-armed countries are simultaneously experimenting with airstrikes, drones, cyber operations, naval manoeuvres, and other forms of multi-domain warfare.
Such actions also undermine the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international law under the United Nations Charter.
“The concept of fighting a limited nuclear war between India and Pakistan is a dangerous illusion. Given the compressed geography, high-alert postures, and the logic of full-spectrum deterrence, there is virtually no escalatory buffer and no meaningful space to fight and contain conflict once thresholds are crossed.”
— Dr Rabia Akhtar
Although the immediate crisis may have de-escalated, its long-term consequences for nuclear signalling, crisis management, and regional diplomacy remain serious.
Pakistan’s Diplomatic Countermeasures
Pakistan’s National Security Committee responded by announcing measures similar to those introduced by India.
- SAARC visas for Indian nationals were suspended or cancelled, except for Sikh pilgrims.
- Indian defence advisers were declared persona non grata.
- The number of staff at the Indian High Commission was reduced to 30.
- Pakistani airspace was closed to Indian airlines.
- All trade with India was suspended.
- India’s decision regarding the Indus Waters Treaty was rejected.
Pakistan also reserved the right to place bilateral agreements, including the Simla Agreement, in abeyance. However, it stopped short of formally suspending them.
One positive development was that the 1988 India-Pakistan Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities remained intact.
Under this confidence-building measure, both countries exchange lists of their nuclear installations every year and commit not to attack them.
Aerial Combat and Competing Military Claims
The crisis reportedly witnessed the first large-scale jet-era aerial confrontation between two nuclear-armed states.
More than 40 Pakistani aircraft, including JF-17s, J-10Cs, and F-16s, reportedly faced more than 80 Indian aircraft, including Rafales, Su-30MKIs, and MiG-29s.
During subsequent military briefings, Pakistan popularised the term “six-nil,” claiming that six Indian aircraft and one unmanned aerial vehicle had been brought down.
The reported losses included:
- Three Rafales
- One Su-30
- One Mirage 2000
- One MiG-29
- One Heron UAV
Pakistan presented the reported downing of Rafale aircraft as a major achievement for the Pakistan Air Force and a setback for India’s expensive defence acquisitions.
Pakistani commentary also questioned the effectiveness of India’s S-400 air defence system.
Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos
Pakistan launched Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos on 10 May.
The operation reportedly targeted Indian military facilities, including bases in:
- Udhampur
- Pathankot
- Adampur
- Bhuj
Pakistani security sources also claimed that a BrahMos missile storage facility in India’s Beas area had been destroyed.
Some damage to military installations was acknowledged by Indian officials, although the full extent remained disputed.
Cyber Operations and Information Warfare
According to Pakistan’s Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, cyber operations were also conducted as part of Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos.
Pakistan claimed that the cyber offensive targeted important Indian digital infrastructure and disrupted websites linked with:
- The Bharatiya Janata Party
- Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited
- The Crime Research Investigation Agency
Pakistan also claimed that more than 2,500 surveillance cameras across India were accessed.
Alongside cyber operations, Pakistan’s information security institutions worked to identify and challenge what they described as Indian disinformation in real time.
The US-Brokered Ceasefire
As the conflict intensified, a ceasefire provided both countries with a route toward de-escalation.
Pakistan had repeatedly called for restraint and presented itself as being prepared to reduce tensions for the sake of regional peace.
Pakistan welcomed the ceasefire announced with American involvement.
India, however, denied that any third party had played a decisive role and stated that the cessation of hostilities followed direct communication between the directors general of military operations of the two countries.
The Continuing Battle of Public Diplomacy
Even after military hostilities declined, the battle of narratives continued internationally.
India launched a global diplomatic campaign by sending delegations to more than 30 countries. These delegations accused Pakistan of supporting groups allegedly involved in attacks in India and Indian-administered Kashmir.
Pakistan responded by sending two high-level peace delegations abroad.
Their objectives included:
- Presenting Pakistan’s response as peaceful and measured
- Highlighting Pakistan’s commitment to international law
- Promoting regional stability
- Calling for dialogue
- Internationalising the humanitarian situation in Kashmir
- Seeking comprehensive talks with India
The delegations reportedly met representatives of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the UN Secretary-General, the president of the UN General Assembly, members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and other international actors.
Operation Mahadev and Pakistan’s Concerns
Pakistan has also criticised India’s reported Operation Mahadev.
Pakistan’s military spokesperson described the operation as involving fake encounters presented as counterterrorism actions.
During a press briefing on 30 April 2025, the Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations claimed that 723 Pakistani nationals were being unlawfully detained in Indian prisons.
Pakistan alleged that some detainees could be killed in staged encounters, after which weapons and other material might be planted and presented through the media as evidence of cross-border terrorism.
Pakistan’s Foreign Office also questioned the credibility of Indian claims linked with the operation.
The Weight of Pre-Pahalgam Tensions
Although the Pahalgam crisis caused a major deterioration in relations, Pakistan-India ties were already deeply strained.
Formal dialogue and the broader peace process had been suspended long before the incident.
The Composite Dialogue, launched in 2003, was suspended following the Mumbai attacks of 2008.
As a result, opportunities for sustained engagement on a wide range of bilateral issues disappeared.
Pakistan argues that India reduced the entire relationship to the issue of cross-border terrorism while avoiding meaningful engagement on other disputes.
The Kashmir Dispute
India’s unilateral changes to the constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019 led Pakistan to downgrade diplomatic relations.
Pakistan recalled its high commissioner and suspended bilateral trade.
Decline of Cricket Diplomacy
Cricket diplomacy also remained limited because India repeatedly refused to send its national team to Pakistan.
Political tensions increasingly influenced sporting relations between the two countries.
Pressure on the Indus Waters Treaty
India had already been seeking revisions to the Indus Waters Treaty before the Pahalgam incident.
Its decision to place the Treaty in abeyance immediately after the attack created a new and serious source of tension.
Other Sources of Bilateral Tension
Other disputes include the case of Indian naval officer Kulbhushan Jadhav, who was arrested by Pakistan in March 2016.
Pakistan has also alleged Indian involvement in the Jaffar Express train hijacking and other militant incidents in Balochistan.
“We must understand that in this terrorist incident in Balochistan, and others before it, the main sponsor is the eastern neighbour, India.”
— Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, Director General ISPR
Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of using terrorism allegations and suspected false-flag operations to damage Pakistan’s international image.
Pakistani officials have questioned the accusations related to Pahalgam, pointing to the incident’s distance from the Line of Control and its timing during the visit of US Vice President J.D. Vance.
Pakistan has also compared the incident with previous cases such as Pulwama, Uri, and the Chattisinghpura massacre, where it argues that accusations were made before impartial investigations were completed.
Where Do Pakistan and India Go from Here?
The bilateral relationship remains burdened by mistrust, unresolved disputes, military competition, and the absence of sustained political engagement.
Following the latest crisis, diplomatic relations remain largely frozen.
Both countries continue to speak at each other rather than to each other, with communication largely limited to military hotlines.
The post-Pahalgam crisis demonstrated that when diplomatic channels are absent, escalation is managed through military posturing and warfare.
This approach is unsustainable in a region where both countries possess nuclear weapons.
Backchannel communication should therefore be restored and strengthened.
Other confidence-building measures should also be expanded, including:
- Regular military-to-military communication
- Advance notification of military exercises
- Restoration of diplomatic representation
- Revival of trade and people-to-people contacts
- Cooperation on water, climate, and disaster management
- Resumption of structured bilateral negotiations
Crisis-driven diplomacy cannot replace consistent and institutionalised engagement.
It is therefore in the interest of both countries, as well as the wider region, for India to respond positively to Pakistan’s call for the restoration of a comprehensive dialogue process.