Pak-Afghan Relations in Shadow of Taliban

Border, Bullets & Brotherhood

Written By: Muska Gul


2021: The Second Coming of the Afghan Taliban

On 15 August 2021, as the world watched in disbelief, the Afghan Taliban swept through Afghanistan with lightning speed, culminating in the fall of Kabul.

The U.S.-backed Afghan government collapsed without resistance, and President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. After two decades of war, the Taliban returned to power, marking the beginning of a new and uncertain chapter not only for Afghanistan but also for its immediate neighbour, Pakistan.

Pakistan had played a key role in facilitating the Doha Agreement between the United States and the Afghan Taliban. Islamabad had hoped that the negotiated withdrawal would lead to a stable and inclusive government in Kabul.

Pakistan expected its diplomatic efforts to translate into goodwill and a cooperative Taliban regime. However, the swift Taliban takeover in August 2021 upended those expectations, revealing a far more complicated and unpredictable reality.


From Recognition to Realignment: Tracing Pakistan-Taliban Relations

Pakistan shares a long and layered history with the Afghan Taliban. It was one of only three countries, along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to officially recognize the Taliban regime during its first rule from 1996 to 2001.

This early recognition reflected Islamabad’s strategic calculation to secure its western border and counter regional rivals.

However, unlike the 1990s, the Taliban’s return in 2021 unfolded in a drastically changed regional and global landscape. This time, the group sought international legitimacy rather than mere recognition, facing a more interconnected world and a war-weary global community.

For Pakistan, the situation was no longer straightforward. As initial optimism faded, Islamabad soon faced a resurgent TTP, rising border tensions, and a refugee crisis.

The assumption that ideological affinity would ensure strategic alignment quickly gave way to a reality marked by unpredictability and mutual mistrust.


Turning Point in Relations: TTP as the Primary Trigger

The TTP’s Resurgence Under Afghan Taliban Rule

The Afghan Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 emboldened their ideological ally, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which quickly resurged from its safe havens in eastern Afghanistan.

Freed from U.S. and Afghan military pressure, the TTP regrouped, rearmed, and launched a wave of attacks inside Pakistan.

According to the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), TTP-led militant attacks surged by 73% in 2022 compared to 2021, with 389 attacks recorded and over 500 people killed, mostly security personnel.

Despite repeated diplomatic engagements, the Afghan Taliban refused to take decisive action against the group. This led to heightened insecurity in Pakistan’s tribal and border regions.

The resurgence of the TTP shattered Pakistan’s expectations of improved internal security after the Taliban takeover and deepened mistrust between the two regimes.


Border Fencing: The Durand Dilemma

Pakistan’s efforts to fence the 2,611-kilometre Durand Line, completed over 94% by early 2023, became a major flashpoint in Pak-Afghan relations.

Pakistan viewed the fence as vital for national security and for curbing cross-border militancy. However, the Afghan Taliban, like previous Afghan governments, do not recognize the Durand Line as an international border.

In December 2021, Taliban fighters reportedly dismantled portions of the fence in Nangarhar province, prompting sharp reactions.

Pakistan’s then Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi remarked:

“The fence is meant to protect, not divide… We will resolve issues through diplomatic channels.”

However, Taliban spokesperson Zabiullah Mujahid responded:

“The fencing has created problems… and we do not want it.”

This long-standing border dispute has become a symbol of deepening mistrust. It continues to complicate bilateral ties and undermine border stability.


Friction Due to the Refugee Issue

Pakistan has hosted over 3 million Afghan refugees for decades, including around 1.4 million registered under UNHCR.

Following the Taliban takeover in 2021, fears of a new influx grew, placing additional pressure on Pakistan’s already burdened infrastructure and economy.

In 2023, Islamabad launched a repatriation campaign targeting undocumented Afghans, citing rising security concerns.

The move drew sharp criticism from the Taliban government, with spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid calling it “inhumane and against Islamic and neighbourly values.”

The issue evolved from a humanitarian challenge into a diplomatic flashpoint. According to UNHCR data, more than 1 million Afghan refugees have been repatriated to Afghanistan so far.


Escalation of Border Skirmishes

Tensions along the Durand Line escalated sharply in late 2024 and early 2025.

Pakistan launched airstrikes against TTP hideouts in Khost and Paktika provinces. In retaliation, Afghan Taliban forces fired across the border, leading to deadly skirmishes near the Torkham crossing.

The clashes resulted in troop injuries, civilian displacement, and a further breakdown in already strained bilateral relations.


Trade and Transit Disruption

The 2025 border clashes severely disrupted Pak-Afghan transit trade.

Key crossings such as Torkham and Chaman were temporarily shut down. Hundreds of trucks were stranded for days, causing major losses to traders and shortages of essential goods in Afghanistan.

The Taliban accused Pakistan of using trade as political leverage, while Pakistani authorities cited security threats.

This disruption deepened economic instability in Afghanistan and further eroded trust between the two neighbours.


India’s Opportunistic Diplomacy

With Pakistan occupied by border clashes and TTP attacks, India used the moment to rebuild goodwill among segments of the Taliban and strengthen ties with anti-Pakistan factions in Afghanistan’s political and tribal circles.

Through this quiet diplomacy, New Delhi tried to counterbalance Islamabad’s traditional influence in Afghan affairs and reposition itself as a stable alternative partner in the region.


Signs of Thaw: Gradual Improvement in Pak-Afghan Relations

Following months of heightened tensions and diplomatic strain, mid-2025 saw cautious efforts by both Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban to de-escalate and reset ties.

Initial efforts included informal tribal jirgas and religious delegations, often called Track-III diplomacy. These efforts helped restore limited communication between local stakeholders across the Durand Line.

These unofficial efforts laid the groundwork for formal engagement, culminating in Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s visit to Kabul in mid-2025.


FM Ishaq Dar’s Visit to Kabul

Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s visit to Kabul marked the first high-level political contact after months of military and diplomatic standoff.

During this visit, Pakistan reiterated its demand for an end to cross-border terrorism and guaranteed a dignified repatriation of Afghan refugees.

Both sides agreed to establish joint mechanisms to address security, trade, transit, and refugee management.

These productive talks laid the groundwork for reopening border crossings and set Pakistan on the path to elevating its diplomatic mission in Kabul shortly afterwards.


Taliban Fatwa Against Cross-Border Terrorism: A Doctrinal Shift

In May 2025, senior Afghan Taliban commander Saeedullah Saeed delivered a pointed fatwa declaring that:

“Fighting in any country, including Pakistan, without the command of the Amir is against Shariah and considered fasad, not jihad.”

This marked a significant doctrinal shift.

The Afghan leadership now explicitly prohibits its fighters and allied groups such as the TTP from launching attacks on Pakistani soil. This reinforced Islamabad’s demands for accountability from the Taliban regime.


China as a Stabilizing Force

On 21 May 2025, China hosted informal trilateral talks between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and China in Beijing.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi chaired the talks, while Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar led Pakistan’s delegation. Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Muttaqi led the Afghan delegation.

In these pivotal talks, multiple MoUs were signed between the three countries.

These included:

  • CPEC extension into Afghanistan
  • Security and counterterrorism framework
  • Diplomatic upgradation

These agreements marked a significant step toward transforming informal dialogue into actionable cooperation.


Diplomatic Reset: Appointment of Ambassadors by Both Neighbours

Just nine days after the trilateral talks, on 30 May 2025, Pakistan announced the elevation of its Chargé d’Affaires in Kabul to ambassador status.

This marked a shift from limited or working-level diplomatic engagement to a complete functional diplomatic relationship, although it fell short of formal recognition of the Taliban government.

On 1 June 2025, the Afghan Taliban reciprocated this move by appointing Sardar Ahmed Shakib as ambassador to Pakistan.

Kabul’s official statement described the upgrade as “paving the way for enhanced bilateral cooperation in multiple domains.”


The Future of Pak-Afghan Relations in a Changing Global Order

The future of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations depends on how both nations adapt to a shifting global landscape shaped by geopolitical realignments, regional economic corridors, and evolving security paradigms.

As global powers like China expand their economic footprint through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative, and as the United States adopts a more distant and interest-based engagement in South Asia, Pakistan and Afghanistan are being pushed to find regional solutions to their bilateral challenges.

For Pakistan, stability in Afghanistan remains essential for securing its western border, protecting CPEC investments, and curbing cross-border terrorism, especially from TTP sanctuaries.

For Taliban-led Afghanistan, improving ties with Pakistan can ease economic isolation, enhance trade access, and attract regional investment.

However, trust deficits and unresolved issues such as the TTP conundrum continue to threaten long-term cooperation.

The success of trilateral mechanisms with China, the continuation of economic diplomacy, and the willingness of the Taliban to transition from ideological rigidity to pragmatic governance will shape the trajectory ahead.

In a multipolar world where regional self-reliance is rising, Pakistan and Afghanistan must shift from transactionalism to long-term strategic trust. Otherwise, they risk remaining vulnerable to external manipulation and internal instability.

The future, though fragile, offers space for a reset, provided both sides move beyond historical grievances toward shared regional interests.